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Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNs
AB S TRACT. Antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive platform most favored nations
(MFN) provisions (also termed pricing parity provisions) can help protect competition in online
markets. An online platform imposes a platform MFN when it requires that providers using its
platform not offer their products or services at a lower price on other platforms. These contractual
provisions may be employed by a variety of online platforms offering, for example, hotel and trans-
portation bookings, consumer goods, digital goods, or handmade craft products. They have been
the subject of antitrust enforcement in Europe but have drawn only limited antitrust scrutiny in
the United States. Our Feature explains why MFNs employed by online platforms can harm com-
petition by keeping prices high and discouraging the entry of new platform rivals, through both
exclusionary and collusive mechanisms, notwithstanding the possibility that some MFNs may fa-
cilitate investment by limiting customer freeriding. We discuss ways by which government enforc-
ers in the United States and private plaintiffs could potentially reach anticompetitive platform
MFNs under the Sherman Act, and the litigation challenges such cases present.
A U T H 0 R S. Jonathan B. Baker is Research Professor of Law at American University Washing-
ton College of Law; and Fiona Scott Morton is the Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics
at Yale University School of Management. The authors are indebted to M.J. Moltenbrey and Steve
Salop. Both authors worked on the e-books antitrust litigation involving Apple for government
plaintiffs. Neither author received financial support for work on this Feature.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, antitrust enforcement against most favored na-
tions (MFN) provisions has grown in the United States and Europe. U.S. gov-
ernment enforcers have brought cases in healthcare, digital goods, and payment
systems, while European agencies have launched a series of challenges to MFNs
imposed by online platforms.'
Given that consumers increasingly use online platforms to purchase goods
and services,2 it is important to analyze their competitive issues. In contrast to
European challenges to platform MFNs, there have been almost no such govern-
ment enforcement actions against platform MFNs in the United States. This
Feature will explain the necessity of U.S. antitrust enforcement against platform
MFNs for protecting competition in these important online markets.
Many of the online platform MFN provisions - also termed price parity pro-
visions - investigated in Europe have been imposed on hotels by leading online
travel agents (OTAs), such as Booking.com and Expedia. The challenged provi-
sions typically prevent hotels from offering rooms on other websites at prices
below those charged on the OTA. While these provisions likely violate U.S. an-
titrust laws, they have drawn only limited scrutiny.'
This Feature relies on this setting to illustrate the need for more vigorous
antitrust enforcement in this platform context, in which the producer or service
provider sets the final retail price. In exchange, the platform charges the pro-
ducer or service provider a fee for distribution. This fee is often a commission
set as a percentage of the final retail price. The arrangement whereby the plat-
form does not take ownership of the good (e.g., the hotel room) but sells it on
behalf of the vendor at a price chosen by the vendor is termed an agency distri-
bution model.' Providers commonly offer their products or services on multiple
online platforms. For example, a hotel may make rooms available on Book-
ing.com, Expedia, and the hotel's own site. A computer manufacturer may offer
its product line through its own site, eBay, and Amazon Marketplace. Online
platforms for hotel and transportation bookings, consumer goods, digital goods,
and handmade craft products are often similarly organized.
1. See infra Part II.
2. The share of U.S. retail sales accounted for by e-commerce has grown by roughly 250% since
2010. See U.S. Census Bureau News, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: 2 Quarter 2017, U.S.
DEP'T COM. (Aug. 17, 2017), http://WWW2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/7q2
.pdf [http://perma.cc/W4LX-JJT8].
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. In some cases, a platform will purchase the product or service from the vendor and resell it to
retail buyers at a markup. This arrangement is termed a wholesale distribution model.
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A platform MFN requires that providers refrain from offering their products
or services at lower prices on other platforms. The platform is thus guaranteed
that no other internet distributor will charge a lower final price, not because the
focal platform has worked to ensure that it has the lowest cost, but rather because
it has contracted for competitors' prices to be no lower. Platform MFNs are la-
beled "wide" if they constrain the price on all other platforms, including the pro-
vider's own website (if any). In contrast, platform MFNs are considered "nar-
row" if they prevent the provider from setting a lower price on its own website,
while leaving prices on other platforms unrestricted. If a platform with an MFN
spots a lower price on another platform, it lowers its price to match. In a market
in which most platforms employ wide MFNs with most providers, providers will
generally need to set an identical price on all platforms.' The provider may agree
to the MFN because it has few practical alternatives given the online platform's
market power, or because the weakened price competition also benefits the pro-
vider. The higher profits that result from higher product prices need not all ac-
crue to the platform. They can be divided between the platform and the vendors.
Part I of our Feature shows how platform MFN contracts can harm compe-
tition and consumers, despite their potential competitive benefits. Our economic
analysis draws on the economics literature on the effects of MFNs generally, and
platform MFNs in particular. We conclude that platform MFNs generally harm
competition, except in narrow circumstances in which freeriding concerns are
especially strong. Part II reviews how and why platform MFNs have been treated
differently in U.S. and European competition law. Finally, Part III argues that
U.S. antitrust enforcers should follow the lead of their European colleagues in
investigating platform MFNs before explaining how a case against platform
MFNs could be structured to fit within existing U.S. precedents.
I. ECONOMICS OF PLATFORM MFNS
This Part describes the competitive effects of simple MFN provisions, before
turning to platform MFNs, the central focus of this Feature. Like platform
MFNs, simple MFNs commit sellers not to discount selectively. We begin with
simple MFNs because they are familiar from the economics literature and case
law and raise analogous competitive issues.
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5. Hence, wide platform MFNs with agency distribution will lead to the same outcome as resale
price maintenance (RPM) with wholesale distribution: products will be sold on all platforms
at identical retail prices, chosen by the vendor.
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A. Competitive Problems of MFN Provisions
1. Simple MFNs
A simple MFN promises the covered buyer that it will be charged the lowest
price offered by the seller. At first blush, one might expect this provision to lead
to a lower price for the covered buyer. However, as explained throughout the
economics literature, there are compelling theoretical reasons to expect equilib-
rium prices to rise due to the MFN. 6 The empirical evidence supports this pre-
diction.' Below, we provide intuitions from this literature.
Some anticompetitive problems created by MFNs are "collusive" -they
weaken price competition.' The term "collusive" includes both coordinated con-
duct and unilateral accommodating conduct that softens competition. To under-
stand how simple MFNs raise prices, consider the seller's incentives. An MFN
creates a strong financial incentive for the seller not to offer low prices because
any discount must be offered to all covered buyers. That penalty makes discounts
offered to buyers expensive. By making it costly for firms to offer their customers
selective (and, in some cases, confidential) discounts, an MFN may reduce those
discounts, soften price competition, and lead to higher prices.'
6. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Judith A. Chevalier, The Competitive Consequences of Most-Fa-
vored-Nations Provisions, 27 ANTITRUST 20, 22-25 (2013) (surveying the economics literature
on the adverse competitive effects of MFNs); Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Devel-
oping an Administrable MFN Enforcement Policy, 27 ANTITRUST 15, 18-19 (2013) (summarizing
the economic literature on the competitive effects of MFNs and proposing ways of making
enforcement against harmful MFNs more effective).
7. See, e.g., Fiona Scott Morton, The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid
Most-Favored-CustomerRules, 28 RAND J. ECON. 269, 282-89 (1997); Sarah Moshary, Adver-
tising Market Distortions from a Most Favored Nation Clause for Political Campaigns 23-26
(July 13, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.dropbox.com/s/vlptl4npwai9zod
/QuantityWithholding.pdf [http://perma.cc/PE43-NJD9].
8. See Baker & Chevalier, supra note 6, at 22-23; Salop & Scott Morton, supra note 6, at 15.
9. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination, in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265, 273-79 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G.
Frank Mathewson eds., 1986); Thomas E. Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit
Collusion, 17 RAND J. ECON. 377, 380-86 (1986); Luca Aguzzoni et al., Can 'Fair'Prices Be
Unfair? A Review of Price Relationship Agreements, OFF. FAIR TRADING 60-83 (Sept. 2012),
http://www.learlab.com/wp-content/uploads/2o16/o4/Can-%E2%8o%98FairE2%80
%99-Prices-Be-Unfair -A-Review-of-Price-Relationship-Agreements.pdf [http://perma.cc
/G 7 D6-BLJT]; Morten Hviid, Summary of the Literature on Price Guarantees, U.E. ANGLIA:
CTR. COMPETITION POL'Y 3-8 (July 2010), http://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/107435/107582
/Summary+of+LPG+1iterature+Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/49L4-CHCT].
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An MFN can alternatively or additionally facilitate coordination, including
tacit collusion, and thus lead to higher prices.o Simple MFNs likely facilitated
coordination between General Electric and Westinghouse in the sale of electrical
equipment," and among DuPont and three other sellers of gasoline additives.12
Coordination leads to higher prices when firms reach consensus on terms of co-
ordination and prevent cheating, or when firms acting independently but in par-
allel respond to rivals' less competitive conduct by accommodating it (i.e., by
competing less aggressively themselves). Consistent with the theory, the afore-
mentioned MFNs discouraged discounting and stabilized prices in both the elec-
trical equipment and gasoline additive markets.
Second, an MFN may create an exclusionary anticompetitive problem.14 An
MFN can raise the costs of current or potential competitors by negotiating lower
prices from suppliers of critical inputs. For example, suppose an entrant wishes
to gain customers by charging a lower price (perhaps because it has no estab-
lished brand name or installed base). It can profitably sell at a low price by un-
dertaking selective contracting with suppliers willing to offer a discount in ex-
change for more volume or other favorable terms. If those suppliers also supply
the incumbent, however, an MFN imposed by the incumbent would require the
supplier to charge the same price to the entrant. This parity undermines the en-
trant's business model by preventing it from making an attractive offer to cus-
tomers. The symmetry that MFNs impose on the marketplace thus can prevent
new competition that would lower prices.
10. "Tacit collusion," a legal term, encompasses some but not all forms of "coordinated" conduct.
See Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Prob-
lem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BuLL. 143, 145 & 145 n.7, 152 n.16, 156
n.22 (1993) (defining tacit collusion and coordination, and distinguishing legal and economic
terms).
n1. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 28228, 1977 WL 1474, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1977)
(prohibiting the use of MFNs and advance price announcements).
12. See In re Ethyl Corp., ioi F.T.C. 425, 628-32 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). The appellate court acknowledged
the anticompetitive potential of MFNs, but reversed primarily on the grounds that the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) did not satisfy the legal standard for demonstrating that the de-
fendant firms had each violated section 5 of the FTC Act by adopting MFNs unilaterally. Id.
13. Id. at 555-562, 630-31; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of a Proposed Modification to the
Final Judgment Entered on October 1, 1962 Against Each Defendant, 42 Fed. Reg. 17,005,
17,oo5-o6 (Mar. 30, 1977).
14. Throughout this Feature, we use the term "exclusion" to encompass both the complete fore-
closure of existing or potential rivals and conduct that disadvantages rivals without necessarily
inducing them to exit. Exclusion does not necessarily harm competition; it is only anticom-
petitive if the excluding firms obtain or maintain market power, such as by raising prices or
keeping a supracompetitive price from declining.
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The Department of Justice's cases against Delta Dental and BCBS Michigan
focused on this anticompetitive possibility." The MFNs in those cases were im-
posed on health care providers by dominant health insurers. Those contractual
provisions made it impossible for entering health insurers to employ selective
contracting with health care providers to cut the price of the insurance they sold
in competition with incumbent insurers. This made entry more difficult for a
new rival whose competitive advantage was low prices and thereby permitted
the dominant insurance providers to maintain high prices.
2. Platform MFNs
Platform MFNs differ from simple MFNs because they are agreements be-
tween sellers and platforms about the prices that sellers will charge buyers who
purchase through rival platforms, not agreements between sellers and buyers
about the prices that sellers will charge other buyers. The two types of MFNs
nonetheless raise similar competitive concerns.
For example, suppose that OTAs typically charge hotels a commission rate
of 30%. If that rate is the product of coordination among OTAs, one of the OTAs
might decide to compete more aggressively ("cheat") by charging a commission
rate of 15% to hotels that agree to offer lower priced rooms. With or without
coordination, moreover, an entering OTA may charge discounted commissions
to hotels that offer rooms at a discounted rate, in order to break into the market.
Regardless of whether the OTA is cheating or entering, the OTA can profit if it
attracts a significant number of travelers seeking discount hotel bookings. Hotels
listing through the OTA may also profit. A hotel may earn more per booking
after the commission is subtracted, or profit from the increased bookings.16
A platform MFN imposed by an incumbent OTA could prevent these out-
breaks of competition. The MFN would require each hotel making rooms avail-
able on the incumbent's platform to set the same price on a rival's or entrant's
platform. This parity may undermine the discount OTA's business model by pre-
15. See United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665, 671-76, 679 (E.D.
Mich. 2011) (denying the defendant's motion to dismiss); United States v. Delta Dental of
R.I., 943 F. Supp. 172, 172-182 (D.R.I. 1996) (denying the insurer's motion to dismiss). As
these cases indicate, MFN exclusion problems may arise in industries that require the for-
mation of a network of final providers: dental insurers need a network of dentists (Delta Den-
tal), and health insurers need a network of hospitals (BCBS Michigan).
16. Numerically, imagine a $1oo hotel room yielding $70 to the hotel after the incumbent's 30%
commission is paid. If the entering OTA lists the room at $90 and charges a 15% commission
of $13.50, the hotel would earn a net $76.50, making it better off. Even if the hotel earns less
per room with the entering OTA- as would be the case with a 20% commission - the hotel
may earn more overall if it fills sufficiently more rooms by listing them at a discounted price.
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venting it from making attractive offers to hotels (suppliers) and travelers (cus-
tomers). The MFN may prevent cheating that would undermine OTA coordina-
tion and exclude entrants that would reduce supracompetitive commission rates
adopted by a dominant OTA or achieved by an OTA oligopoly with market
power.
In anticipation of our later discussion of antitrust enforcement," it is useful
to classify the competitive problems created by platform MFNs on two dimen-
sions. First, the mechanism can be collusive or exclusionary (or both)." Second,
the MFNs can harm competition among platforms or vendors (or both). While
our Feature is primarily concerned with collusive and exclusionary harms to plat-
form competition (given the growing proliferation and economic significance of
internet platforms), we recognize that MFNs can also harm competition among
sellers. "
Platform MFNs with greater scope and duration would be expected to have
stronger anticompetitive effects and impose larger penalties on hotels that sell
through a discount OTA.2 0 As the share of hotels using MFNs increases, the pool
of potential providers that can sell at a discount through an entering or cheating
OTA decreases. Thus, a discount OTA will be less likely to succeed. Likewise, as
the share of total bookings accounted for by incumbent OTAs with MFNs in-
creases, the costlier it becomes for hotels to list rooms at a discounted rate on an
entering or cheating OTA (or the costlier it becomes for the entering or cheating
OTA to compensate the hotel). Thus, incumbent or entering OTAs will be less
likely to adopt a discount business model.
17. See infra Part II.
18. Some cases may involve both collusion and exclusion. Colluding firms may need to exclude
non-colluding rivals and entrants in order for their collusive arrangement to succeed.
ig. In the OTA example, a platform MFN could support coordination among vendors (hotels)
by discouraging cheating.
20. An "MFN plus" requires the price on the covered platform (or the price to the covered buyer)
to be strictly lower by a certain percentage than prices on competing platforms (or to compet-
ing buyers). These contracts ensure that the covered platform can post a price (or has costs)
that are below those of its rivals. This feature makes it even more difficult for rival platforms
to cheat or enter at a discount, thereby increasing the anticompetitive potential of the platform
MFN.
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B. Potential Efficiencies
Although the economics literature indicates that platform MFNs often harm
competition, platform MFNs can generate efficiencies under the right circum-
stances.2 Online platform MFNs in particular have been justified as protecting
investment incentives by preventing freeriding (or "showrooming"22 ). While
the balance between harms and efficiencies may vary across markets, we are
skeptical that this justification will routinely prevail.
Suppose, for example, that a small hotel makes rooms available on an OTA
like Booking.com or Expedia. That relationship benefits the hotel by bringing it
to the attention of customers that search for rooms using the OTA, who are likely
far more numerous than the customers that the hotel could reach on its own. By
making rooms available on the OTA, the hotel can market itself to consumers
who prefer to compare features and prices before purchasing or those who prefer
to conduct their search through an OTA. The hotel likely makes rooms available
on other OTAs too, as well as on the hotel's own site.
An OTA's business requires many hotels to list on its site: by providing con-
sumers with the ability to search conveniently across a broad range of hotels and
make comparisons, the OTA attracts more customers. Critically for our analysis,
an OTA makes its money by keeping a share of the revenue of hotel rooms
booked through its site. Because hotels pay the OTA only if there is a booking,
the OTA has an incentive to design its site and functionality to promote good
matches between travelers and hotels.
Absent an MFN, a hotel could have good reasons to set a lower price on other
OTAs or on the hotel's site. The set of consumers that visit the hotel's own site
or an alternative OTA, such as an OTA that caters to student travelers, might be
more responsive to price or might care less about particular features of the
rooms. Furthermore, the alternative distribution channels might have lower
costs than the OTA imposing the MFN. For example, another OTA might charge
a lower commission. Or the hotel might not have invested in a highly functional
21. Under some circumstances, for example, MFNs can make investments profitable by protect-
ing relationship-specific investments, discouraging holdouts, or reducing transaction and ne-
gotiation costs. See generally Baker & Chevalier, supra note 6, at 20-22 (surveying the econom-
ics literature on the competitive effects of MFNs); Joshua S. Gans, Mobile Application Pricing,
24 INFO. ECON. &POL'Y 52, 52-54 (2012) (arguing that most favored customer clauses can allow
platform providers to earn more profits and increase the likelihood that the platform is pro-
vided); Salop & Scott Morton, supra note 6, at 17-19 (summarizing the economic literature on
the competitive effects of MFNs).
22. Buyers "showroom" when they visit a store to examine a product before buying online at a
discount. This practice is a type of freeriding.
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website and thus might be able to process a booking at a cost below the OTA's
commission.
When these different prices exist, some consumers may respond by freerid-
ing: they will search for rooms on an OTA that facilitates searching and compar-
ison among many hotels, but book through the hotel site or a rival OTA that
offers a lower price. When the lower price arises because the rival has lower costs
(e.g., it charges no commission), the consumer has taken advantage of the costly
functionality supplied by one OTA without paying for it.
If many hotels and consumers engage in such practices, the efficiency theory
goes, the OTA would foresee this problem and not invest in producing the de-
sired functionality. The OTA may not find it profitable to invest in expensive site
features, even though consumers are willing to pay for them. Such features
might include an attractive design or convenient search and comparison tools. If
the OTA cuts back on upgrading its interface and features and on marketing its
services, it will lose customers. If freeriding is important, therefore, quality com-
petition in online travel may be harmed. Full service OTAs would come to have
less competitive significance over time and would eventually exit. Only no-frills
discounters and hotel-only sites would thrive, so consumers' transaction costs of
searching would rise.
In theory, an MFN could prevent this outcome.2 3 It would allow a full-ser-
vice OTA to prevent hotel freeriding on the OTA's advertising efforts, thereby
allowing the OTA to be compensated for the promotional services it provides. If
consumers value full-service OTAs highly, they will be better off as a result.
However, there are two reasons to question whether freeriding would be so
substantial as to make full-service OTAs unprofitable and induce their exit. The
first is consumer transaction costs: some consumers will not be willing to iden-
tify hotels on one site (the full-service OTA), then find and book them on other
sites (a no-frills OTA or hotel site). The cost savings from sticking with a full-
23. Theoretical analyses involving platform MFNs that incorporate consumer freeriding find that
wide MFNs are harmful to consumers while narrow MFNs can be beneficial but are not nec-
essarily so. See Chengsi Wang & Julian Wright, Platform Investment and Price Parity Clauses 28-
29 (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 16-17, 2016), http://www.netinst.org/Wang_16-17.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Y5ER-2CLB] (finding that there is insufficient platform investment with-
out price parity clauses but that wide price parity clauses unambiguously lower consumer
welfare); Chengsi Wang & Julian Wright, Search Platforms: Showrooming and Price Parity
Clauses 35-37 (May 18, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://cepr.org/sites/default/files
/Wright,%2oJulian%2opaper 0.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CYS-SD2L] (suggesting that narrow
price parity clauses are often more beneficial than wide price parity clauses); cf Bjorn Olav
Johansen & Thibaud Verg6, Platform Parity Clauses with Direct Sales (Univ. of Bergen Dep't of
Econ., Working Paper No. 1/17, 2017), http://www.uib.no/sites/w3.uib.no/files/attachments
/working paper o1-17_revidert.pdf [http://perma.cc/XZA7-U78V] (arguing that platform
MFNs may make platforms profitable even absent consumer freeriding if competition be-
tween hotels is so fierce as to make it unprofitable for hotels to pay platform commissions).
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service OTA for booking are likely to be greater for frequent OTA users, as they
are likely to have billing information stored on the site. Additionally, the cost
savings are likely to be higher for consumers planning trips that require booking
multiple hotels (and flights, if the OTA offers those), as well as for consumers
that place a high value on their time. Second, the hotels may need the services
that the OTA provides, but find it costly to provide those services themselves. If
the hotels pay the OTA for its services, consumers that search the OTA but pur-
chase on the hotel site would not be freeriding.
These possible limitations on the cost imposed by freeriding-combined
with the incentives to increase prices and the incentives against entry caused by
MFNs - make the economic analysis of a platform market critical. The leading
theoretical analysis by economists Andre Boik and Kenneth Corts finds that plat-
form MFNs lead to higher platform fees, drive up retail prices, and discourage
entry by firms with lower-cost business models.24
More broadly, when an MFN may create both anticompetitive effects and
efficiencies, it is an empirical question whether it would be justified as procom-
petitive in any particular industry.25 A recent study evaluating the banning of
narrow MFNs in German hotel markets found that the ban lowered prices but
did not alter the supply of hotel rooms.26 Although hotel sites typically priced at
a discount to full-service OTAs - a precondition for customer freeriding - the
full-service OTAs did not appear pressured to cut back on investments: the ho-
tels posted more rooms on OTAs than before, and the full-service OTAs did not
change their commission rates.2 7 A second study in Italy, France, and Spain also
found that prices fell when MFNs were banned in the hotel industry.28 To similar
24. Andre Boik & Kenneth S. Corts, The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Com-
petition and Entry, 59 J.L. & ECON. 105, 113-29 (2016). In their model, an entrant pursuing a
lower-cost model cannot enter successfully because the platform MFN prevents the entrant
from lowering prices to attract customers.
25. Thibaud Verg6, Are Price Parity Clauses Necessarily Anticompetitive?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON.
(Jan. 2018), http://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/o1
/CPI-Verge.pdf [http://perma.cc/94CKC-5JJZ].
26. Matthias Hunold et al., Evaluation of Best Price Clauses in Hotel Booking 19-36 (ZEW Ctr. for
European Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 16-o66, 2016), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew
-docs/dp/dpi6o66.pdf [http://perma.cc/R78M-PRW2].
27. Id. at 36.
28. Andrea Mantovani et al., The Dynamics of Online Hotel Prices and the EUBooking.com Case 12-
27 (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 17-04, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract id=3o49339
[http://perma.cc/W9K9-Y 546]. The leading booking site responded to the MFN ban by in-
troducing quality improvements to the service it provided. See id. at 6 tbl.1, suggesting online
platform competition increased when platform MFNs were banned.
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effect, the platform MFNs adopted by Apple in their e-book distribution con-
tracts with publishers led to substantial increases in e-book prices.29 These stud-
ies confirm our view that platform MFNs often harm competition and thus are
appropriate targets for enforcement by U.S. antitrust agencies.
II. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGAINST PLATFORM MFNS
While platform MFNs have been the subject of antitrust enforcement on
both sides of the Atlantic, they have garnered greater attention in Europe.so
What explains this difference? This Part surveys enforcement actions in Europe
(Section II.A) and the United States (Section II.B). Section II.C attributes the
difference primarily to divergent norms governing exclusionary conduct.
A. Europe
In Europe, National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and the European Un-
ion's (EU) enforcement institution have brought cases against Amazon and
travel booking sites. For the most part, European authorities have looked at plat-
form MFNs as potential infringements of Article loi of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU) or equivalent sections of the national
competition laws of member states. Article ioi prohibits agreements that pre-
vent, restrict, or distort competition." Platform MFNs imposed by a dominant
29. Jonathan B. Baker, Cartel Ringmaster or Competition Creator? The Ebooks Case Against Apple
(2o13), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: EcoNoMICs, COMPETITION, AND PoLIcY (John E.
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 7 th ed.) (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1), http://
ssm.com/abstract= 3009492 [http://perma.cc/EG3Z-5GCR]; Babur De los Santos & Matthijs
R. Wildenbeest, E-book Pricing and Vertical Restraints, 15 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING & EcoN.
85,91(2017).
30. See generally Directorate Fin. and Enter. Affairs Competition Comm., Hearing on Across Plat-
form Parity Agreements, OECD (Oct. 27-28, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments
/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2o15)66&doclanguage=en [http://
perma.cc/4FBR-DPAL] (explaining the regulatory approach to platform MFNs taken by the
United Kingdom's Competition and Markets Authority and describing its competitive con-
cerns with MFNs); Pinar Akman & D. Daniel Sokol, Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust
Law and Economics, REV. INDUS. ECON. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2852782
[http://perma.cc/SU7L-XXP8] (analyzing antitrust cases against MFNs in the United States,
Europe, and Australia).
31. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, May
9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88-89.
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firm could also be found to infringe Article 102, which prohibits abuse of a dom-
inant position.32
In October 2012, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the United Kingdom-
now the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) - opened an investigation
into the MFNs adopted by Amazon Marketplace." At that time, a business that
sold through Amazon was prohibited from selling products at a lower price on
any competing website, including the seller's own site. The Bundeskartellamt
(Germany's Federal Cartel Office) opened an investigation contemporaneously.
Amazon.de then accounted for 30-40% of online commerce in Germany.34 The
Bundeskartellamt found anticompetitive effects in both pricing and entry." Ten
months later, Amazon voluntarily removed the pricing parity requirement in Eu-
rope (though it retained the policy in the United States).36 Thereafter, both the
OFT and the Bundeskartellamt closed their investigations.3
Since 2010, MFN clauses used in the online hotel booking sector have been
investigated by the NCAs of a number of European nations." The largest OTA
32. Id. art. 102. See generally Pinar Akman, A Competition Law Assessment of Platform Most-Favored-
Customer Clauses, 12J. COMPETITION L. &EcoN. 781 (2016) (reviewing the legal authority em-
ployed in European platform MFN cases and arguing that European authorities have wrongly
opted to rely on Article ioi rather than Article 102 when challenging MFNs imposed by dom-
inant platforms).
33. See Caroline Binham & Henry Mance, OFT Minded To Drop Investigation into Amazon Pricing
Policies, FIN. TIMEs (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.ft.com/content/b7fe3790-1oa5-ne3-b5e4
-ool44feabdco [http://perma.cc/G8DB-NVUT].
34. Case Report: Amazon Removes Price Parity Obligation for Retailers on Its Marketplace Platform,
Ref.: B6-46/12, BUNDESKARTELLAMT 1 (Dec. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Case Report], http://
www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/2o13
/B6-46-12.pdf? blob=publicationFile&v=2 [http://perma.cc/5VGV-Q9QF]. The Bun-
deskartellamt noted that Amazon enforced the price parity clause by threatening to remove
sellers from the platform for noncompliance.
3s. Id. at 2 ("The Bundeskartellamt initiated proceedings ... on account of the rules within the
Marketplace, particularly the price parity clause. It found that the Marketplace constitutes a
horizontal trade cooperation between Amazon and third-party sellers that has as its object and
effect various restrictions of competition. The price parity clause is a hardcore restriction
which is not indispensable for Marketplace efficiencies and does not allow consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit.").
36. Binham & Mance, supra note 33.
37. Id.; see also Case Report, supra note 34, at 3.
38. In addition to the nations discussed in the text, MFNs have reportedly been investigated on
competition grounds in Ireland, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Belgium,
Austria, Switzerland, and Greece. See Akman & Sokol, supra note 3o, at 18 n.11. Furthermore,
the competition authorities in eleven European Union jurisdictions and two other nations
carried out a coordinated monitoring exercise of the online hotel booking sector in 2016. See
EUR. COMPETITION NETwoRK, REPORT ON THE MONITORING EXERCISE CARRIED OUT IN THE
ONLINE HOTEL BOOKING SECTOR BY EU COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IN 2016 (2017),
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in Europe is Booking.com, which has more than a 6o% share of the market-
place." In the United Kingdom, OFT found that the combination of MFNs and
resale price maintenance (RPM) limited competition on hotel room rates and
impeded entry by new online travel agents. Although its decision was later re-
versed, this reversal was due primarily to OFT's failure to fully consider the com-
petitive problems that could arise from the remedy it chose.40 In Germany,
around the same time, the Bundeskartellamt opened an investigation into OTAs
that resulted in the prohibition of a wide MFN used by a major hotel platform.4 1
Independently, the competition authorities in three other European nations
(France, Italy, and Sweden) conducted a joint investigation of Booking.com, de-
signed to aid and inform other concerned member states.42 Their effort was re-
solved when they accepted the commitment of Booking.com to change its wide
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel monitoring report en.pdf [http://perma.cc
/K 7YA-TD2E]. Notwithstanding the range of nations interested in the competitive implica-
tions of these provisions, the European Commission apparently declined to conduct a Europe-
wide investigation. See Akman & Sokol, supra note 30, at 18.
39. Sean O'Neill, French Parliament Kills Rate Parity, and Booking Predicts Hotel Price War,
TNOOZ (June 19, 2015), http://www.tnooz.com/article/french-parliament-kills-rate-parity
-and-booking-predicts-hotel-price-war [http://perma.cc/836H-B262].
40. Hotel Online Booking: Decision To Accept Commitments To Remove Certain Discounting
Restrictions for Online Travel Agents [2014] OFT 1, OFT1514dec, rev'd, Skyscanner Ltd. v.
Competition and Mkts. Auth. [2014] CAT 16. OFT's successor closed the investigation the
following year "on administrative priority grounds" and indicated that it would continue to
monitor how the market developed, particularly in response to then-recent changes in the
business practices of major OTAs across Europe. Press Release, CMA, CMA Closes Hotel
Online Booking Investigation (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.gov.uk/govemment/news/cma
-closes-hotel-online-booking-investigation [http://perma.cc/T4WS-CVJ6].
41. See Online Hotel Portal HRS's 'Best Price' Clause Violates Competition Law -Proceedings Also
Initiated Against Other Hotel Portals, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www
.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2013/20_12 2013
_HRS.html [http://perma.cc/56AS-DD9C]. Its decision was affirmed by the Disseldorf
Higher Regional Court. See 'Best Price' Clause of Online Hotel Portal Booking Also Violates Com-
petition Law, BUNDESKARTELLAMT 2 (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de
/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/K artellverbot/2o16/B9-121-13.pdf? blob=
publicationFile&v=2 [http://perma.cc/FJD6 -JE9M].
42. See Philippe Chappate & Helen Townley, Online Hotel Bookings -AJoint European Approach or
a Most Favoured Nation?, SLAUGHTER & MAY (May 2015), http://www.slaughterandmay.com
/media/2497093/online-hotel-bookings-a-joint-european-approach-or-a-most-favoured
-nation.pdf [http://perma.cc/X99Q-JSFC].
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MFN to a narrow MFN.4 3 Subsequently, Booking.com expanded its commit-
ment to cover the EU, and Expedia followed suit.44 This did not end the compe-
tition concerns throughout Europe, however. The Bundeskartellamt next
banned Booking.com's use of a narrow MFN.4 5 Not long after, the legislatures
of Austria, France, and Italy banned all MFNs, narrow as well as wide,4 6 appar-
ently in response to lobbying by local hotel interests.47 Retrospective studies in
some of these jurisdictions provide evidence that consumers benefited when nar-
row as well as wide hotel MFNs were prohibited.4 8 In addition to these cases,
the UK's CMA has investigated MFNs in a number of other industries: private
motor insurance, mobility scooters, and live auction services. 9 A recent report
details the CMA's current policies concerning MFNs.so
B. The United States
43. See EUR. COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 38, at 4. In addition, the competition
authority of Brazil, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE), recently
settled a case against Booking.com on similar terms. See Janith Aranze, CADE Settles
with Booking.com on Price Parity Clauses, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (Mar. 28, 2018), http://
globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1167349/cade-settles-with-bookingcom-on-price
-parity-clauses [http://perma.cc/8Q9W-ZPKT].
44. Id.
45. See Narrow 'Best Price' Clauses of Booking Also Anticompetitive, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Dec.
23, 2015), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen
/2015/23_12_2015_Booking.com.html [http://perma.cc/LU2H-7TXF].
46. See EUR. COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 38, at 4-5; Press Release, Hotrec Hospitality
Europe, Also Italy Prohibits Rate Parity Clauses of Online Booking Platforms by Law
(Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-1714/also-italy-prohibits
-rate-parity-clauses-of-online-booking-platforms-by-law.aspx [http://perma.cc/4LFD
-Q9VM].
47. Cf Press Release, supra note 46 (describing support for the bans by an industry trade associ-
ation).
48. Hunold et al., supra note 26, at 2-4, 24-34, 39-40; Mantovani et al., supra note 28, at 1-4, 12-
13, 18-21, 35-37.
49. See Alasdair Smith, Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation: Notice ofPossible Remedies Un-
der Rule 11 of the Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, UK COMPETITION COMM'N (Dec.
17, 2013), http://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5329dec3ed915doe5do0029b/131217
remedies notice.pdf [http://perma.cc/M9KN-GKE4]; Auction Services- Competition and
Markets Authority Investigation Under the Competition Act 1998, Case No. 5o4o8, CMA (June 29,
2017), http://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5954besc4Ofob6oa44oo0o92/auction
-services-commitments-decision.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZHH-WL8E]; Mobility Scooters:
Anti-Competitive Practices, CMA (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/medical
-equipment-anti-competitive-practices [http://perma.cc/R82S-XLQL].
50. Digital Comparison Tools Market Study, CMA (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.gov.uk/cma-cases
/digital-comparison-tools-market-study [http://perma.cc/SRP3-JQEJ].
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While cases challenging anticompetitive platform MFNs are less common in
the United States, they would likely be framed as agreements in restraint of trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, or as monopolization or attempts
to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act." A Sherman Act
Section 1 case requires proof that the MFN is introduced by agreement, either
among rivals or between upstream and downstream firms. An agreement is not
required under Section 2. On the other hand, a Sherman Act Section 2 case re-
quires proof that the defendant exercises monopoly power (for monopolization)
or has a dangerous probability of achieving a monopoly (for attempt to monop-
olize). In practice, this requirement generally means that cases are not brought
under Section 2 unless the defendant has a high market share.52
The courts are converging on a common burden-shifting approach to ana-
lyzing whether agreements are unreasonable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
and whether a firm with monopoly power has engaged in predatory conduct un-
der Section 2 of the Sherman Act." In both settings, a plaintiff that proffers a
prima facie case shifts the burden of production to the defendant. If the defend-
ant satisfies that burden, the plaintiff must satisfy a burden of persuasion ac-
counting for the harms and benefits to competition. In both settings, the analysis
may be truncated, allowing condemnation of conduct without full analysis.
U.S. courts have contended with the potential anticompetitive effects of
MFNs for decades, although largely not in the context of online platforms. Be-
fore the 198os, the major U.S. decisions grappled primarily with the problem of
whether to infer an agreement to fix prices when rivals used MFNs unilaterally
but in parallel to facilitate coordination. More recent cases have focused on
MFNs that facilitate higher prices by both preventing rival discounting and dis-
couraging entry.54
51. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012). FTC enforcement actions would be brought under section 5 of the
FTC Act, applying Sherman Act principles. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
52. In monopolization cases, courts that look to market shares for proof of monopoly power are
reluctant to do so when the defendant has a market share below seventy percent. HERBERT
HOVENKMIP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAw OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
§ 6.2a (5 th ed. 2016). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has noted that courts should decline to
find a dangerous probability of an attempt to monopolize when the defendant has a market
share below thirty percent and should be reluctant to do so when the share is between thirty
and fifty percent. Id. § 6. 5b2 (citing M & M Med. Supplies & Serv. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp.,
981 F.2d 160, 168 (4 th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). Monopoly power can also be demonstrated with
direct evidence. E.g., Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3 d 995, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999).
53. See Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 544-50
(2013).
54. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev'd, 838 F.3 d 179
(2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017); United
States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2011); United
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The recent e-books litigation presents the primary U.S. example of antitrust
enforcement against a platform MFN.ss The case arose with Apple's introduc-
tion of the iBookstore, an e-book retailer. At the time of Apple's entry, Amazon
was the leading e-book retailer.56 Amazon employed a wholesale distribution
model (by which Amazon paid the publishers a wholesale price and set the retail
price), charging low prices to customers.1 7 Apple did not expect the iBookstore
to be profitable with retail prices at the level Amazon charged."
A federal district court in New York found that when entering the market,
Apple set out to reduce price competition from Amazon by using an MFN.s9
Apple adopted an agency distribution model (by which the publishers set the
retail price and paid Apple a 30% commission). 60 Its iBookstore distribution
contracts with five leading e-book publishers included MFN provisions and
price caps for different categories of e-books,6 1 all of which were above the then-
current Amazon sales prices.62 Under the MFN provisions, if a specific book
were offered by Amazon or another e-book retailer at a price that was below the
price that the publisher selected for the iBookstore, the publisher was required
to reduce the iBookstore's price to match.63 These discounts would have been
costly for publishers if Amazon had continued its discount e-book pricing, so all
five publishers converted their contracts with Amazon to agency models and
raised the retail prices to the price caps. 64 The MFN also helped discourage price-
cutting once the publishers had obtained pricing authority and increased e-book
prices. The district court's opinion clearly and correctly explained the impact of
States v. Delta Dental of R.I., 943 F. Supp. 172 (D.R.I. 1996); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Ver-
tical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer"
Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 520-33 (1996) (describing U.S. cases). The appellate decision
in American Express was concerned primarily with market definition in cases involving two-
sided platforms, not the competitive effects of an MFN.
55. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 791 F.3 d 290 (2d Cir.
2015). See generally Baker, supra note 29 (discussing the case from an economic perspective).
56. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
57. Id. at 649. Amazon sold many e-books at retail prices below the wholesale prices that Amazon
paid the publishers and was known for its discount retail pricing. Id. at 650.
58. See id. at 656-58.
59. Id. at 662-63.
6o. Id. at 648, 664.
61. Id. at 664.
62. Id. at 667.
63. Id. at 664.
64. Id. at 681-82. The MFN meant that if Amazon did not raise its retail prices the publisher would
earn less per book from the iBookstore than from Amazon, because the publisher's compen-
sation after Apple's commission would be less than the wholesale price paid by Amazon. Id. at
665.
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the MFN on price competition, finding in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found
that the MFN provisions "not only protected Apple by guaranteeing it could
match the lowest retail price listed on any competitor's e-bookstore, but also im-
posed a severe financial penalty upon the Publisher Defendants if they did not
force Amazon and other retailers similarly to change their business models and
cede control over e-book pricing to the Publishers."65
Platform MFNs were also the subject of two other recent U.S. cases.66 in
American Express, the government challenged MFNs imposed by American Ex-
press in its contracts with retailers that accepted the Amex card. The contracts
prevented rival cards from charging lower prices (card fees) to retailers, as a rival
might seek to do to increase its share of retail payment transactions. The con-
tracts included nondiscrimination provisions tantamount to MFNs. These pro-
visions prevented the retailers from passing on lower card fees to shoppers by
offering them discounts for using a less expensive rival card.67 The government
argued that competition was harmed, because the retailers were discouraged
from steering shoppers to American Express's competitors (rival platforms), and
thus, those competitors were discouraged from cutting fees. 68
The district court agreed, but the Second Circuit held that the district court
had not properly defined the relevant market to account for the potential benefit
to American Express cardholders. 69 The Second Circuit did not successfully rec-
oncile its holding with the district court's finding that cardholders were injured
by the challenged conduct. The court also made analytical errors 70 and distorted
65. Id. at 648.
66. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), revd, 838 F.3 d 179
(2d Cit. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017); In re
Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litig., 997 F. Supp. 2d 526 (N.D. Tex.
2014).
67. American Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 165.
68. Id. at 15o.
69. American Express, 838 F.3 d at 206.
70. The Second Circuit panel described plaintiffs' initial burden of proving harm to competition
in terms of defendant's net price, not the market price. Id. at 205-o6 ("Plaintiffs' initial burden
was to show that the NDPs made all Amex consumers on both sides of the platform ... worse
off overall . . .. Because Plaintiffs provided neither 'a reliable measure of American Express's
per transaction margins,' nor 'a reliable measure of American Express's two-sided price that
appropriately accounts for the value or cost of the rewards paid to cardholders, they failed to
meet their burden to show anticompetitive effects directly." (citations omitted)). The panel
also rejected the district court's factual finding that higher prices on one side of the defendant's
platform were not fully passed through to the other side. Although economists would con-
sider this an empirical question, the Second Circuit treated it as a question of law. Compare id.
at 204 n-52 (stating that the district court's conclusion that the challenged conduct raised retail
prices was erroneous because "it fails to take into account offsetting benefits to cardholders in
the form of rewards and other services"), with id. at 205 (acknowledging that " [t] he District
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the law's burden-shifting framework to favor defendants.7 Although the appel-
late opinion suggested that the panel's holding would not apply to platform
MFNs,72 the thrust of the Second Circuit decision was to make challenges to
such practices more difficult. The Supreme Court recently decided to review this
decision.
Second, private plaintiffs in 2014 challenged price-fixing of hotel room
rates by OTAs.74 The district court dismissed the complaint primarily on the
ground that the putative class of consumer plaintiffs did not allege sufficient
facts from which to infer that the eight OTA defendants introduced their
parallel MFNs by agreement.75 This disposition meant that the court did not
reach the question of whether the MFNs harmed competition. 76 The U.S.
Court fairly observed that Amex's 'price increases were not wholly offset by additional rewards
expenditures or otherwise passed through to cardholders"' and that the record suggests that
"not all of Amex's gains from increased merchant fees [were] passed along to cardholders in
the form of rewards"). In addition, the Second Circuit defined a product market to encompass
services that are not demand substitutes, combining services provided to cardholders and ser-
vices provided to merchants. See id. at 204-05 ("Here, the market as a whole includes both
cardholders and merchants. . . ."). Doing so is inconsistent with the way that markets are
generally defined under Supreme Court precedent. See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition:
An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 132-33 (2007) (describing the demand substi-
tution focus of market definition); id. at 134 n-30 (explaining that feedback between the sides
of a two-sided platform should be accounted for in the analysis of competitive effects, not
market definition); cf. id. at 157-59 (explaining that "cluster markets" inappropriately collect
demand complements, although they may occasionally be defended as a matter of analytical
convenience or as specifying the initial product with which market definition analysis begins).
71. The district court properly defined separate markets for network services (used by merchants)
and general service cards (used by cardholders). That approach means that when the plaintiff
shows that competition was harmed in the network services market, the defendant has the
burden of production to show offsetting benefits to cardholders. If competitive effects are
evaluated with reference to a single net price accounting for effects on both merchants and
cardholders, as required by the appellate panel's market definition, the burden of showing the
absence of offsetting benefits to cardholders is placed on the plaintiff.
72. The appellate panel disclaimed concern with platform competition when distinguishing the
market definition in another case. American Express, 838 F.3 d at 198 ("Unlike the contested
conduct in this case, the contested conduct in [the distinguished case] occurred not among
different sides of the same network platform, but rather between the platforms themselves.").
73. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017). For a discussion of market definition issues
raised by two-sided platforms, see Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and
Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142 (2018).
74. In re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litig., 997 F. Supp. 2d 526 (N.D. Tex.
2014).
75. Id. at 537-43.
76. Id. at 549.
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engagement with platform MFNs, limited to these three cases, compares un-
favorably with European enforcement.
C. Cross-Atlantic Differences
The platform MFN cases brought by NCAs in Europe and Brazil" appear to
be appropriate enforcement actions, with sound theoretical and empirical bases.
It is hard to explain on economic grounds why such cases have not been brought
in the United States. The regions are likely similar across most meaningful di-
mensions, including the use of MFNs by online platforms, the potential for com-
petitive harm, and the likelihood and costs of freeriding. For example, high-in-
come travelers seeking a hotel room in another city are as likely to care about
price and quality (e.g., a good view or a quiet room) in both regions and as likely
to rely on online hotel booking platforms." Hotels in both jurisdictions likely
value the ability to set different prices in different distribution channels similarly.
Finally, new travel platforms do not appear to face drastically different entry con-
ditions between the two continents.
Nor do differences in legal rules explain the greater European attention to
platform MFN cases. In both regions, the competition policy regime prohibits a
wide range of anticompetitive practices, whether adopted unilaterally by domi-
nant firms or through agreement. There is no serious argument that platform
MFNs are exempt on either side of the Atlantic. Rather, the enforcement dis-
crepancy is likely due to the relatively greater interest that European enforcers
have shown in pursuing anticompetitive, exclusionary conduct. The antitrust
norms governing exclusion are more contested in the United States than in Eu-
rope," and European enforcement against platform MFNs often involves exclu-
sionary conduct. This background difference -which may discourage both pri-
vate and public cases in the United States - may be exacerbated by the way
resources are allocated at U.S. antitrust agencies. The agencies necessarily give
priority to merger investigations, which have statutory deadlines, over conduct
77. See Aranze, supra note 43.
78. Sun, Sea and Surfing, ECONOMIST (June 21, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news
/business/21604598 -market-booking-travel-online-rapidly-consolidating-sun-sea-and
-surfing [http://perma.cc/2APC-WL 7 A] (noting that 43% of total travel sales in the United
States and 45% of total travel sales in Europe occur through OTAs).
79. See Baker, supra note 53, at 527-29 (documenting that U.S. courts and commentators down-
play exclusion rhetorically); id. at 534 (explaining that U.S. legal norms concerning exclusion
are contested); id. at 577 n.238 (noting greater concern with exclusionary conduct in Europe).
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cases.so Doing so can slow nonmerger investigations when merger filings spike
or when agencies are subject to hiring freezes or budgetary limitations.
III. U.S. ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
The potential competitive dangers from platform MFNs call for antitrust
scrutiny. This Part discusses how U.S. government enforcers and private plain-
tiffs could potentially reach anticompetitive platform MFNs under the Sherman
Act -and the litigation challenges presented by such cases. We emphasize the
(unilateral) incentives created by MFNs for incumbent platforms to charge
higher prices and potential entrants not to enter, because we suspect such con-
duct and its competitive harms will initially prove the most fertile ground for
enforcement. Additionally, we focus on harms to platform -rather than seller -
competition, even though the latter could also be a source of competitive harm
and consequently an appropriate subject for antitrust scrutiny." We adopt this
focus because platforms are growing in economic significance.
Moreover, our discussion gives the greatest attention to harms resulting from
anticompetitive exclusion. The adoption of platform MFNs is likely to harm
competition through exclusion-absent efficiencies, because scale economies in
platform operation typically create oligopoly markets that do not perform com-
petitively. Platforms often benefit from strong scale economies in demand (net-
work effects). They may also benefit from scale economies in supply. Exclusion-
ary conduct that prevents a new entrant from gaining a toehold is particularly
problematic when the market is likely to be concentrated, such that firms are
competing more for the market itself than for a share of the market.
The setting we analyze has vendors selling goods or services through online
platforms. The vendors set the sales price for their customers and pay the plat-
form a transaction fee built into the price.82 The platform in turn requires ven-
dors not to sell for less on other sites or platforms. This platform MFN prevents
the vendor from allowing its product to be offered at a lower price on its own
80. See Albert A. Foer, The Federal Antitrust Commitment: Providing Resources to Meet the Challenge,
AM. ANTITRUST INST. 5, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/whitepaper o2112oo71704
.pdf [http://perma.cc/47SR-EJTK] (noting that because of statutory deadlines, merger in-
vestigations increased from 36% of the Antitrust Division's caseload in 1970 to 76% in 1998).
81. For example, hotels could enlist OTAs to impose MFNs to soften price competition among
themselves (a collusive mechanism), thereby increasing room rates. Or a dominant hotel
chain could enlist OTAs to impose wide MFNs to prevent a rival hotel chain from competing
by discounting heavily on its own site (an exclusionary mechanism), thereby preserving high
prices.
82. When transaction fees are built into the final price (e.g., as a percentage), a platform charging
a lower fee cannot pass the savings through to consumers without violating the MFN.
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website (if any) or on a rival platform." As a result, entrants are excluded, al-
lowing the platform (or platforms) imposing the MFN to charge supracompet-
itive prices. This anticompetitive outcome derives from unilateral platform con-
duct.
A. Exclusion of Rival Platforms or Entrants
In the most straightforward platform exclusion case, the platform imposing
the MFN on vendors is the dominant online retailer of the product or service.
The MFN is thought to protect the platform's market power from erosion by
discouraging entrants who would compete on price. The entrant might charge a
lower commission to vendors that agree to pass through their savings by lower-
ing the price consumers would pay.
With a dominant platform, the Justice Department, state attorneys general,
or private plaintiffs could bring a monopolization case, claiming a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.84 As previously explained, plaintiffs generally
prove the monopoly power element of the monopolization offense by showing
that the defendant platform has a high market share. Markets in which firms
have high fixed costs and network effects -including online platform markets
such as OTAs - are often concentrated." Thus, this element is likely to be satis-
fied in many platform MFN cases. However, this predicate for liability means
that Section 2 of the Sherman Act may not capture all exclusionary problems
from platform MFNs: even a platform with a substantially lower share than the
threshold for proof of monopoly power (e.g., 30%) may represent enough busi-
ness to induce sellers to accept and comply with its MFN.8 6 Collectively, covered
platforms may represent a sufficient share of the market to create anticompetitive
effects, even if all individual platforms are relatively small. Accordingly, we also
discuss enforcement against platform MFNs that exclude platform rivals under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which does not require proof of monopoly power.
83. If a price reduction is spotted elsewhere, the platform with the MFN lowers the price charged
to the minimum in the market and the provider bears the cost of the reduction.
84. The Federal Trade Commission could employ section 5 of the FTC Act (presumably applying
the principles of section 2 of the Sherman Act). The conduct could also or instead be chal-
lenged as an attempt to monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act or as a violation of
state unfair competition laws. We do not discuss these alternative approaches.
85. See generally JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE: PRICE COMPETITION, AD-
VERTISING, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION (1991) (providing a theoretical analysis
and case studies demonstrating that firms often make sunk investments to attract a larger
share of growing market demand, leading to more concentrated markets).
86. If MFNs are introduced by platforms with small shares (e.g., less than 10%) only, then they
are unlikely to create competitive problems.
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The market shares used to prove monopoly power depend upon the market
definition. Shares will be higher - and a Section 2 case will often be stronger - if
market participants include online sellers but not brick-and-mortar retailers. In
the context of hotel bookings, for example, this would mean defining the market
as the online sale of hotel reservations through OTAs and websites." The market
would exclude bookings made through brick-and-mortar travel agents or by tel-
ephone. Limiting the product market to online sales is generally supported by
consumer behavior in the kinds of platforms that we discuss in this Feature."
To prove monopolization, the plaintiff must also show that the dominant
online platform engaged in exclusionary conduct to achieve or maintain its mo-
nopoly power. In the MFN context, this is straightforward. A plaintiff would
prove its case by showing that the dominant platform prevented a rival or entrant
from cutting fees to sellers willing to lower prices for customers." A court could
reasonably infer that the platform engaged in exclusionary conduct from the
terms of a contract between the platform and the seller if the contract explicitly
requires the vendor to provide price parity. The plaintiff may also be able to sup-
port its case by identifying platforms that attempted to enter but were stymied
by the MFN.90
If multiple platforms use MFNs but none is dominant, the practice could
nonetheless exclude the entry of rival platforms that would compete over price.
The sum of the market shares of the covered platforms would need to be suffi-
ciently large to ensure that the MFNs would discourage sellers from marketing
their products on those platforms.9 As previously discussed, it is possible that
competition could be harmed even if only a single non-dominant platform - act-
ing unilaterally-employed MFNs. However, these competitive harms are not
easily addressed under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
87. That was the product market alleged in In re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust
Litig., 997 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529-30 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
88. Market definition may also be affected by the Supreme Court's resolution of United States v.
Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 355 (2017). See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
89. E.g., Complaint at 24-26, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14155
(D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2010).
go. The Justice Department, the plaintiffin both American Express and Blue Cross, identified pro-
spective entrants or rivals excluded by the MFN in both cases. See id. at 24-25; Second Con-
solidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 56, 78, American Express, 838 F.3 d 179 (No. CV-
10-4496).
91. If the covered platforms collectively had a small share, sellers attracted to offering their prod-
ucts on the entrant's platform could find it profitable to withdraw their products or services
from the platforms with MFNs, or negotiate with those platforms to remove the MFNs.
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Absent a dominant platform, an exclusion case would most likely be brought
under Section 1.9 2 Section i's agreement requirement should be satisfied so long
as the MFNs were included in the (vertical) contracts between platforms and
sellers." Additionally, if the rival platforms colluded or coordinated to exclude
entrants, the plaintiff could satisfy the statute's agreement requirement by show-
ing that the MFNs were introduced as the product of a (horizontal) agreement
among the platforms.9 4
When no platform is dominant, a plaintiff is more likely to succeed in prov-
ing competitive harm when the collective share of commerce in the relevant mar-
ket subject to MFNs is greater. If some platforms adopt MFNs before others, the
MFNs might not harm competition until other platforms follow suit, and a crit-
ical mass of platforms and hotels are covered. Then a case against the initial plat-
forms would need to challenge their decisions to continue using MFNs after
market conditions had changed, not their earlier decisions to introduce those
contractual provisions.'
92. The competitive harm from MFNs could also be challenged under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
However, that statute is unlikely to reach conduct that would not also violate Section i of the
ShermanAct. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128,142 (2d Cir. 1984)
(noting that, even if the FTC had "authority under § 5 to forbid legitimate, non-collusive
business practices which substantially lessen competition," the record did not show sufficient
competitive harm). The FTC could also consider prohibiting anticompetitive MFNs in an
industry through rulemaking. See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF AN-
TITRUST ENFORCEMENT 141-43 (2011); Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilem-
mas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST
BULL. 143, 207-19 (1993); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New
Data and Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, lo9 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 677-82 (2009);
Adam Speegle, Note,AntitrustRulemaking as a Solution to Abuse on the Standard-Setting Process,
110 MICH. L. REv. 847, 865-73 (2012).
93. Joseph J. Simons, Fixing Price with Your Victim: Efficiency and Collusion with Competitor-Based
Formula Pricing Clauses, 17 HOFSTRAL. REV. 599, 626 (1989).
94. Id. One recent case challenging MFNs in online hotel booking alleged a horizontal agreement,
but was dismissed for failure to allege sufficient facts from which such an agreement could be
found. See In re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litig., 997 F. Supp. 2d 526,
537-43 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
95. When MFNs are adopted sequentially, a defendant is unlikely to prevail by arguing that it was
the only platform using MFNs at the time it began to do so, or by arguing that once other
platforms instituted MFNs, it had no choice but to follow. Putting aside criminal enforcement
and the attempt to monopolize offense, evidence of intent matters only to the extent that it
makes an inference of anticompetitive effects more or less probable. See, e.g., United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3 d 34 , 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Evidence of the intent behind the conduct
of a monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the
monopolist's conduct.").
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In a Section 2 monopolization case, the exclusionary conduct element would
most likely be evaluated through the application of a burden-shifting frame-
work, allowing defendants to proffer a procompetitive justification.96 A Section
1 case challenging vertical MFN agreements would be evaluated under the rule
of reason, again allowing defendants to provide a justification." However, a hor-
izontal agreement among platforms to institute MFNs could be held illegal per
se under Section 1.98
Defendants will most likely attempt to cast their MFNs as protecting plat-
form investment incentives by eliminating freeriding. A defendant might seek to
prove this justification with evidence that, before introducing the MFN, it had
been considering limiting its investments in platform improvements due to the
freeriding threat. A plaintiff can rebut this argument with empirical evidence,
such as studies suggesting that even narrow MFNs are unnecessary to protect
investment incentives by OTAs.99 A plaintiff might further support a rebuttal
with evidence that the consumer transaction costs of freeriding are high, or that
the dominant platform charges a fee sufficient to compensate it for the services
it provides to freeriders.
If the freeriding concern is serious and if vendors typically sell through their
own websites, the evidence may show that a narrow MFN would likely solve the
96. Id. at 58-59. In the absence of a plausible efficiency justification, a court may be able to con-
demn the dominant firm's imposition of an MFN as monopolization "without a comprehen-
sive analysis of [its] nature, history, purpose, and actual or probable effect." See Jonathan B.
Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 548 (2013).
97. In the absence of a horizontal agreement to adopt the MFNs, the rule of reason would apply.
This is so regardless of whether the MFNs are viewed as non-price vertical restraints, see, e.g.,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18, 59 (1977), or vertical restraints
concerning price, see, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881
(2007). Wide MFNs broadly employed have an economic effect similar to that of resale price
maintenance (RPM): both practices result in all sellers charging the same price to all custom-
ers. In the language sometimes used to describe vertical restraints, platform MFNs - like the
RPM agreements analyzed in Leegin - are intrabrand restraints that can harm interbrand com-
petition.
g8. Under the modem burden-shifting framework, the horizontal agreement could be termed
illegal per se if the court concluded that (1) the agreement was, on its face, tantamount to
price-fixing; or (2) the competitive harm was otherwise obvious and the MFNs had no plau-
sible business justification. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff would satisfy its initial
burden of production without proof of market power, the defendant would have no cogniza-
ble defense, and the court would condemn the practice without extensive analysis of its com-
petitive effects. See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILUAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D.
WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAw IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 246-58 (3d ed. 2017) (describing the contemporary application of the rule of reason to
horizontal restraints); see id. at 181-84 (characterizing the per se rule from economic and legal
perspectives).
99. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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problem. 0 0 Under such circumstances, a narrow MFN would be a less restrictive
alternative to a wide MFN and could be the basis for a settlement or remedy after
a defendant is found liable. The evidence might also show that platforms can
discourage freeriding in a less anticompetitive way by charging a per-transaction
fee not based on value (i.e., a fixed dollar fee rather than a fixed percentage). So
long as there is some competitive harm, an MFN could be found exclusionary
when a less restrictive alternative exists without the need to compare harms and
benefits. o
Freeriding is not necessarily a better defense in an agreement case involving
a market in which no firm is dominant than in a monopolization case against a
dominant firm. However, the analysis of the defense may be more complex in
the former. On the one hand, consumers would have more choices among plat-
forms, so freeriding may be more prevalent. On the other hand, when sellers
have more platform choices, the increased competition may lower fees paid to
sellers, so consumers may not have as much incentive to free ride. Substitution
patterns across platforms and empirical evidence of freeriding would be critical
for evaluating a freeriding justification in a case challenging the use of platform
MFNs when no platform is dominant.
B. Coordination Among Rival Platforms
Our legal analysis has emphasized the possibility that a dominant platform -
or one or more competing platforms - could harm competition by imposing
MFNs that exclude current or potential competitors. But that is not the only
possible anticompetitive mechanism. As the economic analysis above indicates,
platform MFNs can also harm competition through two coordinated mecha-
100. Digital Comparison Tools Market Study, supra note 50, § 4.92, at 57-58. On the other hand, a
narrow MFN along with a best-price guarantee may have similar harmful consequences to a
wide MFN. See Francesca Wals & Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Platform Monopolization by Nar-
row-PPC-BPG Combination: Booking et al. (Amsterdam Law Sch., Research Paper No. 2017-
32, 2017).
101. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n-32, 61o-ii (1985)
(holding that the petitioner violated section 2 of the Sherman Act); O'Bannon v. Nat'l Colle-
giate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070-79 ( 9 th Cir. 2015) (holding that the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association's compensation rules violated section i of the Sherman Act); Multi-
state Legal Studies v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publ'ns, Inc., 63 F.3 d 1540,
1556-57 (ioth Cir. 1995) (denying summary judgment on a claim under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F-3 d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1993) (remanding and hold-
ing that the plaintiff must identify a less restrictive alternative to prove a claim under section
1 of the Sherman Act).
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nisms: (1) discouraging cheating on consensus terms among competing plat-
forms; and (2) inducing parallel accommodating conduct that leads rival plat-
forms to charge higher prices.
If the conduct involves an agreement among multiple platforms to introduce
MFNs, this conduct could be challenged as a horizontal agreement under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. As discussed above, such an agreement may be illegal
per se.102 However, although agreements among rivals can be inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence, it can be challenging to prove them without direct evi-
dence.as Alternatively, evidence of an MFN introduced by vertical agreement
would also satisfy the agreement requirement of Section 1. The case would then
most likely be evaluated under the rule of reason.
CONCLUSION
This Feature has explained why MFNs employed by online platforms can
harm competition by keeping prices high and discouraging entry, notwithstand-
ing the possibility that some MFNs may reduce inefficient freeriding. The prev-
alence of MFN contract terms on online platforms104 and the steadily growing
share of GDP spent on such platforms 0 s suggest that greater antitrust enforce-
ment against anticompetitive platform MFNs could have noticeable benefits for
productivity and consumer welfare. That conclusion is also consistent with the
results of retrospective studies of the consequences of the elimination of MFNs
by European OTAs, described above.106
We find that there are no practical impediments and limited legal constraints
preventing U.S. enforcement against anticompetitive platform MFNs. This is an
important area for enforcement attention because platforms play a significant
role in the economy, the economic analysis of their anticompetitive potential is
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., In re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litig., 997 F. SUpp. 2d 526,
534-43 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (finding that the plaintiffs' "circumstantial facts" were insufficient to
allege a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
104. The prevalence of platform MFN contracts is suggested by the range of industries in which
their use has been investigated, including dental insurance, health insurance, motor insur-
ance, mobility scooters, credit cards, OTAs, and ecommerce platforms. The United Kingdom's
CMA reported that it found examples of MFNs in all of the sectors in which it focused when
studying digital comparison tools. Digital Comparison Tools Market Study, supra note So, §§ 1.7,
4-90, at 7, 57 (identifying focus sectors).
105. Mark Knickrehm et al., Digital Disruption: The Growth Multiplier, ACCENTURE STRATEGY
(2016), http://www.accenture.com/t2ol6o9o5Tooo41Z__w us-enLacnmedia/PDF-4
/Accenture-Strategy-Digital-Disruption-Growth-Multiplier.pdf [http://perma.cc/QRA3
-WXHN].
io6. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
2201
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
clear and compelling, and the European experience has shown that challenges to
such practices can improve consumer welfare.
The academic and popular literature today is concerned with high levels of
concentration in internet businesses."o0 Because MFNs can serve as a barrier to
entry by lower-cost platforms, these provisions may make online commerce
more concentrated than necessary, limiting competition. Antitrust enforcement
targeting anticompetitive platform MFNs has the potential to increase entry and
price competition, and thereby enhance productivity and consumer welfare.
107. See generally Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time ofPopulism, INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming)
(discussing decreased economic competition and increased interest in antitrust enforcement
in the United States); Jonathan B. Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today, WASHING-
TON CTR. EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 20,2017), http://equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis
/market-power-in-the-u-s-economy-today [http://perma.cc/3D2P-JCC4] (explaining why
market power is a major issue despite well-established antitrust enforcement institutions and
legal precedents).
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